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Abstract
The hypothesis of the Americanization of European club sports competitions has been the subject of much analysis. The
main concept examined in this article is the growing reliance on demographic criteria, particularly the economic potential of
the market zone. The purpose is to consider the consequences (rather than the likelihood) of a scenario in which
demographic criteria become the sole variables of club location and their qualification in European championships. Such a
change would have consequences for the both the private (shareholders or potential investors, direct supporters or general
audience, sponsors, etc.) and public (federations, local government, states, European governing bodies) sectors.
The first part of the paper reviews the relevant demographic criteria in sports and then recalls the current strategies for
league organization on both sides of the Atlantic. The second part is devoted to assessing the consequences of these
strategies for those involved. General questions are then raised about the future of professional sports teams in Europe.
The analytical method is based on principles taken from demographics, geomarketing (as geographic information system,
GIS) and the political economy of sport. The data concern six major leagues on both sides of the Atlantic.
Keywords: Professional sports, demographic, geographic, location, regulation
Keypoints
. The location of professional sports teams differs
in Europe and North America.
. European organizational modes are changing by
placing growing importance on demographic
criteria for access to championships.
. Stakeholders and shareholders must adapt their
policies to this revolution.
Two appreciably different operating models have
often been observed in professional sports leagues.
The North American model puts together franchised
clubs that are expected to maximize financial profits.
Championships thus take place only according to
economic criteria regarding market access (Baade,
1996; Cocco & Jones, 1997; Danielson, 2001; El
Hodiri & Quirk, 1974; El-Hodiri & Quirk, 1971;
Fort & Quirk, 1992, 2004; Longley, 1995; Neale,
1964; Scully, 1995; Vrooman, 1995). Each team
brings its local wealth to the network and contributes
to the prosperity of all. One of the major factors in
choosing a club location, either for relocation or
expansion, is therefore the local economic potential
and the quality of the sports facilities that can be
offered to the potential league qualifier.
The European model emphasizes sports results
achieved under balanced financial constraints. Lea-
gue organization is based on sporting criteria and
operates according to a system of promotion/relega-
tion at a national scale and on annual qualification at
the European level (Bourg & Gouguet, 1998; Caiger
& Gardiner, 2000; Gouguet & Primault, 2003;
Kesenne, 1996; Noll, 2002; Ravenel, 1998; Szy-
manski & Smith, 1997; Vamplew, 1988; Walker,
1986). For the past 15 years, however, European
sports have evolved considerably and the ‘American-
ization’ of club championships has often been
examined in the literature (Andreff, 2000; Andreff
& Staudohar, 2000; Bourg, 2003; Fort & Quirk,
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2002; Hoehn & Szymansky, 1999; Kesenne, 2000,
2002; Lavoie, 2003; Szymanski & Ross, 2002).
This article considers the consequences (and not
the probability) of such a scenario for European
sports producers. If the demographic variable often
referred to as ‘local potential’ were to become
determinant, the way leagues are organized in the
Old Continent would be appreciably modified. The
change would have powerful effects on all involved,
whether from the private sector (shareholders or
potential investors, supporters, sponsors, federa-
tions) or the public sector (local government,
national government, European governing bodies).
The commercial aspects and public acceptance of
new policies will not be discussed, but the political
aspects of this change will be explored.
Such a revolution, following an entire century of a
fixed mode of operating, would substantially modify
the power relationships and the governance of
European professional sports. The organization of
championships based solely on economic criteria
would force many actors to adopt new strategies in a
realm where the public sector and, more generally,
the local community are major stakeholders. The
reduced significance of national borders has already
greatly modified the political economy of European
professional teams, with the Bosman case in 1995.
Closed multinational leagues, with the threat of
private control, would be a second shock-wave
whose consequences deserve careful study.
This article focuses on the question of whether the
local potential of the trade area should become the
key to championship qualification. The idea is not
really new: in most other sectors of activity, the
physical location of a commercial enterprise is a key
to success. In the case of sports, mass consumption
via television may be a given, but local, direct
supporters are a significant and essential source of
revenue. Moreover, this source has an impact on
other club resources, as well (Andreff, 2000; Andreff
& Staudohar, 2000).
In the professional leagues, the networks of clubs
participating in the same championships have tried
to establish themselves in densely populated and
economically wealthy geographic regions (Augustin,
1995; Bale, 1993; Danielson, 2001; Durand &
Bayle, 2002). Moreover, the collaboration among
teams needed to produce balanced / and thus
credible and saleable / championships, has pushed
the leagues to look for a certain level of homogeneity
in the qualifying clubs: the solidarity that is so vital is
achieved by balanced contributions that ensure the
prosperity of all.
In terms of method, our approach borrows
rom demography, geomarketing (Geographic Infor-
mation Systems) and the political economy of sports.
The data presented concern sic major leagues
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Four
North American major leagues are analysed (the
NBA for basketball, NFL for American football,
NHL for hockey and MLB for baseball). In Europe,
football (soccer) and basketball are mainly consid-
ered.
The first part of this paper deals with two points.
It reviews the concept of local potential in sports
(IA) and defines the current strategies for league
organization on both sides of the Atlantic (IB). The
second part is devoted to the effects of these
strategies. The consequences for all involved are
first considered (IIA) and then general questions are
raised regarding the future of European professional
sports teams (IIB).
The notion of local potential in professional
sports
A professional club has potentially four main types of
client: direct supporters, corporate clients, local
government and the media.
Historically, direct supporters have been the major
financial resource. However, the ratio of revenues
from this source has greatly declined since the
sixties under the pressure of broadcasting and
corporate clients (Andreff, 2000; Andreff & Staudo-
har, 2000). Although their financial contribution has
been reduced, direct supporters nevertheless
remain the cornerstone of a professional club. More-
over, merchandising is still a powerful opportunity
for big clubs to exploit their ‘brand’. Beyond
quantitative factors, the quality of direct, local
supporters is a key factor in location. These suppor-
ters can be characterized by complementary vari-
ables: their disposable income and likelihood
to support the team, and their propensity to
consume. Throughout the world, sports producers
have chosen (as far as possible) to ‘‘select’’ their
direct supporters by raising ticket prices, thereby
consigning the masses to watching the match on
television.
Small businesses and corporations constitute the
second type of client. Communication within and by
means of sports has become a traditional method of
promoting one’s business. Business sponsors pur-
chase advertising space in the vicinity of, and on, the
playing field. These companies also commit to the
purchase of public relations operations. For exam-
ple, the creation of associated services (car park,
restaurants, catering) also increases revenues.
Although some clubs attract national or interna-
tional brands as sponsors, the local presence of
powerful companies is still a key element of success.
These clients are relatively inelastic to prices and are
generally solvent, offering a good market on a
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regional scale and even in some cases on a national
scale.1
The third type of client, local authorities, is found
all over the world. Their financial assistance and
their involvement vary markedly from one country to
another, from one sport to another, and according to
the level at which the club competes (Durand &
Bayle, 2002). A powerful local government is a
major condition for the choice of location. It ensures
that the club will benefit in several key areas: the
construction and maintenance of facilities (arenas,
skating rinks, etc.), as well as direct and indirect
financial help (tax exemptions, purchases of services,
and so on).
In the United States, the debate on massive public
financing of sports arenas has generated an abundant
and often highly critical literature (Baade & Math-
eson, 2001; Cagan, 1999; Coates & Humphreys,
1999; Jones & Walsh, 1988; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997;
Quirk & Fort, 1999; Rosentraub, 1999; Ross, 1992;
Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). In Europe, the major
financial crisis in the minor leagues or lower national
divisions, which is related to wage inflation and the
failure of media groups, has led governments to
intervene to try to save their local team(s). Public
financing (on the basis of tax breaks and/or legal aid)
is justified on the grounds that a sports club
is a source of local identity shared by the entire
community.
The media (in particular, television broadcasters)
are the fourth source of financing for professional
clubs. The major broadcasting companies (whether
pay-for-view or not) have become the principal
clients of many clubs and even, in many cases, of
the leagues. This has been achieved by means of
collectively negotiated contracts. However, only a
very few clubs and major leagues attract these
clients, and the less prestigious clubs and the lower
level championships benefit only through a system of
solidarity. Thus, in principle, television rights may
help to equalize the opportunities to attract national
sports clubs, since location becomes less dependent
on local potential.
The analysis of local potential must also take into
account the competitive framework. Although, gen-
erally speaking, a sports club is in competition with
other types of live performances and leisure activ-
ities, the local market is divided between the
producers of various sports (or even various teams
of the same sport). Thus, territorial monopoly is
much sought after by the producers, even though /
at least in principle / it is prohibited by the
regulatory authorities.
The economic competition between clubs (even
with substitutive activities) suggests the importance
of examining the operation of three types of ex-
pertise, in addition to the strategy of local potential
(which is by definition dependent on the environ-
ment). This is presented in Figure 1.
Commercial expertise (I) has the goal of trans-
forming the available local potential into revenues.
The available money is then used for production.
Expertise in management (II) is dedicated to keeping
expenditures within the estimated and strategic
limits, which will determine the financial results.
Last, sports expertise (III) is crucial to ensure the
productivity of the committed expenditures. It
should be noted that the sports results partially
influence club revenues, with success in the field
facilitating ticket sales.
The vital role of this triple expertise suggests that
the correlation between local potential and sports
and/or financial results is not absolute and that
human know-how can compensate for environmen-
tal factors to some extent. A club with a powerful
sales network, rigorous management and expert
technical staff can compensate for a poor location.
However, in the case of similar levels of expertise,
location in a large rich city offers opportunities for
better results. In fact, the current literature dealing
with the relationship between financial expenditures
and sports results shows overwhelmingly (Deloitte &
Touche, 2002; Durand, 1999; Levin, Mitchell,
Volcker, & Will, 2000; Ligue Football Professionnel,
2002; Noll, 2002; Szymanski & Ross, 2000; Vam-
plew, 1988; Walker, 1986) that if money cannot do
the whole job, it certainly helps!
Figure 1. Three types of expertise for a professional sports team.
1 The agreement between Manchester United and Nike, the sports equipment supplier, is an extreme case. The ten-year contract may
yield more than 150 million euros. A shorter agreement between MU and Vodafone involves sponsoring shirts. For less prestigious teams,
local business clubs often become privileged partners. In principle, these clubs have proved to be more faithful and sentimental in their
choices and expectations.
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Modes of organizing leagues
Szymanski and Ross (2000)suggest that the funda-
mental difference between the structure of sports in
the US and in the rest of the world, is openness.
‘Closed’ North American leagues
The North American leagues are, and have always
been, organised according to economic criteria. A
club’s entry into a championship requires prior
agreement by the already participating clubs and,
independently, remaining in the league will depend
on good financial health. Although teams were
sometimes located in small East Coast cities up to
World War II, this is no longer the case: for the past
half century, the leagues have been structured on
strictly demographic criteria.
A commercial strategy is thus essential. In the North
American leagues, the emergence of new teams,
the relocation of existing teams, and bankruptcies
have all followed the economic trends of the country.
North American major-league clubs locate in
large metropolises, with a ratio of population to
number of clubs to that varies from 1 to 42 (Table I)
(Figure 2).
For cities having only one or two teams, there is a
threshold of approximately one million inhabitants,
below which no city is likely to attract a major-league
club.3 On the other hand, only three cities of more
than one million inhabitants do not host at least one
major-league club.
Despite the willingness to hold competitions
between cities with comparable economic resources,
disparities exist in terms of both potentials and the
existing sports facilities. Moreover, tax and socio-
economic disparities among the different states have
an impact, especially between Canada and the USA.
The North American doctrine for regulating the
leagues aims at rebalancing these disparities in order
to maintain uncertainty about, and thus interest in
the championships.
The leagues take into account both location (for
either a new team or a relocating team) and the
quality of the facilities. These two points are the
central variables nowadays. When a league an-
nounces an opening in its network, local lobbying
groups immediately arise to pressure local govern-
ments to finance the construction of facilities cap-
able of housing the newly admitted team.
The term ‘closed league’ is generally used for the
American sports model. A closer look at the demo-
graphics of the American leagues nevertheless puts
this term into clearer perspective: The composition
of the championships is endlessly changing, testify-
ing to the adaptability of the network. Whether it be
club relocations or the creation of new franchises,
the characteristics of the championships have shown
strong fluctuations for more than a century (Daniel-
son, 2001).
The clubs belong to a network because they need
to collaborate to produce a competition. Once
admitted to the championship, the newcomer is
required to pay a sum of money that serves the
dual function of compensating the other member
clubs and opening up the network resources to the
newcomer.4 This system is often compared to the
franchising system in the trade or service sectors,
which has operated for more than a century. It
guarantees a permanent place in the championship
for the investors, with no risk of being excluded for
poor performance in competition.
The European system of championship promotion and
relegation
In Europe, access to the major championships is based
on competitive results (winning games). The system
works by relegating the lowest-ranked teams to the
lower divisions and promoting the leading teams of
lower divisions to increasingly higher divisions.
This is true for all national sports in Europe.
Thus, every year teams are confronted with the risk
of being excluded from the biggest market. The
system is the same for European-level competition:
participation is based on the performance reached in
the framework of the national leagues. However, in
1999 basketball in Europe underwent a revolution
when a European league was created with access
based not only on athletic criteria but also on a pluri-
annual invitation. The European Union of Basket-
ball Leagues (ULEB), which was created in 1991, in
fact instituted a ‘private’ competition for the first
time in 2001. This competition operates outside the
realm of the traditional federal powers and its access
is partially reserved to a few invited clubs.
2 (1 to 3 if New York and Los Angeles are excluded).
3 Note the exception of the Green Bay Packers of Green Bay, Wisconsin (fewer than 200,000 inhabitants).
4 The sum varies with the league. The last four clubs admitted to the NHL paid $80 M each in 1997 (compared to $50 million in 1992).
In the MLB the same year, Tampa Bay paid $135 million whereas in 1995, two newcomers paid $95 million. Two NBA clubs created in
1994 paid $125 million. The Cleveland NFL team created in 1998 cost its promoters $530 million and this was only the entry fee. In this
last case, the inflation was huge since two newcomers in 1993 had paid only $140 million.
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Apart from this exception, the strategy described
above has been followed in Europe for almost 50
years for football and 30 years for basketball, with
specific features concerning the organization and
hierarchy of championships. The following tables
show the populations of the cities hosting a first-
division club in soccer for the 2001/2002 season
(Tables II/IV). It is worth noting that both small
and big cities are represented and that a few big cities
and their inhabitants are absent.
Table I. Club location in USA Cities (rank 1 to 48) (2001, NBA, MLB, NFL, NHL, 2001).
Rank Aire Metropolitaine Population 1999 Franchises 1999/2000*
Baseball Basket Hockey Football Total
1 New York NY 20 137 458 2 2 3 2 9
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach CA 15 971 490 2 2 2 6
3 Chicago IL 8 871 473 2 1 1 1 5
4 Washington DC 7 357 978 1 1 1 2 5
5 San Francisco CA 6 910 027 2 1 1 2 6
6 Philadelphia PA-NJ 5 997 338 1 1 1 1 4
7 Boston MA-NH 5 906 195 1 1 1 1 4
8 Detroit MI 5 480 630 1 1 1 1 4
9 Dallas TX 4 922 135 1 1 1 1 4
10 Houston TX 4 499 312 1 1 2
11 Atlanta GA 3 858 546 1 1 1 1 4
12 Miami FL 3 713 764 1 1 1 1 4
13 Seattle WA 3 478 312 1 1 1 3
14 Phoenix AZ 3 021 874 1 1 1 1 4
15 Cleveland OH 2 913 549 1 1 1 3
16 Minneapolis-St. Paul MN-WI 2 866 692 1 1 1 1 4
17 San Diego CA 2 832 478 1 1 2
18 St. Louis MO-IL 2 571 036 1 1 1 3
19 Denver CO 2 411 685 1 1 1 1 4
20 Pittsburgh PA 2 335 624 1 1 1 3
21 Tampa-St. Petersburg FL 2 287 586 1 1 1 3
22 Portland-Vancouver OR-WA 2 188 866 1 1
23 Cincinnati OH-KY-IN 1 962 892 1 1 2
24 Kansas City MO-KS 1 754 538 1 1 2
25 Sacramento CA 1 713 756 1 1
26 Milwaukee-WI 1 647 162 1 1 2
27 San Antonio TX 1 564 553 1 1
28 Norfolk VI 1 549 461
29 Orlando FL 1 544 455 1 1
30 Indianapolis IN 1 534 680 1 1 2
31 Columbus OH 1 482 958 1 1
32 Charlotte NC-SC 1 415 871 1 1 2
33 Las Vegas NV-AZ 1 382 124
34 New Orleans LA 1 310 657 1 1
35 Salt Lake City UT 1 285 294 1 1
36 Greensboro NC 1 182 172
37 Nashville TN 1 176 596 1 1 2
38 Buffalo-Niagara Falls NY 1 143 636 1 1 2
39 Austin TX 1 141 449
40 Hartford CT 1 111 485
41 Raleigh NC 1 108 900 1 1
42 Memphis TN-AR-MS 1 103 510
43 Rochester NY 1 080 743
44 Jacksonville FL 1 064 087 1 1
45 West Palm Beach FL 1 052 250
46 Grand Rapids MI 1 049 335
47 Oklahoma City OK 1 048 952
48 Louisville KY-IN 1 004 400
*Only franchises which are in the USA have been noted. Several Canadian teams should be added to complete this list (Vancouver, Toronto,
Ottawa, . . .). Only the Green Bay Packers, located in a city of less than one million people, does not appear.
Source: US Census Data.
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When we correlated the populations of cities
with the index of European success in soccer and
basketball,5 several important elements emerged.
First of all, the relationship among league member-
ship, success and position in the urban population
hierarchy was clearly verified: an increase in the size
of the city was, on average, correlated with an
increase in points. However, the relationship
was not the same for the two sports. For soccer
(Figures 3 and 4) a population threshold of about
one million inhabitants can be noted, in addition to a
strong correlation, above which the clubs are highly
ranked.
Over a more recent period, the dominant role of
Europe’s largest cities is clearly observed in the
UEFA Champion’s League for soccer as can be
seen in Table V.
Over the last eight seasons, no city of less than one
million inhabitants has been at the top of the list.
Rösenborg (16th in the list) followed by La Coruna,
Monaco and Nantes are all good clubs but do not
often appear, showing a total of only 15 cumulative
participations. Valencia and its 1.5 million inhabi-
tants is ranked 7th with only three appearances
despite excellent results (two finals and a quarter-
final).
As far as basketball is concerned, the relationship
is less obvious (Figures 5 and 6). The data followed
the hierarchical principle up to about one million
inhabitants. However, no population threshold dis-
tinguishes the largest European cities and lower
performances are even observed in the 1-to-2 million
inhabitants range. Madrid, Barcelona, Milan and
Athens have always been successful but the differ-
ence with other cities is not as marked as in football.
Over a more recent period, the club rankings after
three years of the ULEB Euroleague show that the
rules of this ‘closed’ basketball league allow some
medium-sized cities to participate and even to put in
respectable performances (Table VI).
This was the case for Treviso and Bologna, which
are better rated than Barcelona (3rd), Athens (6th),
Moscow (9th) and Madrid (10th). The Basque
city of Vittoria (4th) ranks close to Piraeus, Bologna
and Ljubljana. The trophy, however, has gone to
Barcelona, Athens and Bologna. Although not
statistically significant, this observation confirms
the dominant position of the largest cities / or of
the clubs that ‘live’ above their financial means:
Bologna and especially Treviso (under administra-
tion since the spring of 2003) are in difficult financial
straits.
In both sports, performances show a drop for the
biggest cities (above 5 million inhabitants). Calcula-
tions were made for only four (London, Paris,
Istanbul and Moscow) but, for the latter two, the
economic impact was not in line with the number of
inhabitants.6
Today, strong differences in the local potential of
teams in the same league are a reality not only in all
of Europe’s national championships but also in all
European-level competitions. In the United States,
the leagues take into account the local potential in
both the economic and athletic organization of
championships in order to preserve competitive
balance. In Europe, on the other hand, this strategy
is ignored. However, under increasing pressure from
reality and club demands, a complete change in
strategy is likely. What would the major conse-
quences of such a change be?
Strategic consequences
Four major elements may be underlined concerning
both private investors and public actors.
Figure 2. Population to number of clubs in the North American
major leagues (2001).
5 In football, the index of success is built according to a points system proposed by the world database, ‘histora.org’. It synthesizes both
the win rate and the rank achieved in the play-offs. The number of ‘European points’ is calculated for each club according to its results and
the level of difficulty of the competitions. In order to limit the number of clubs, we considered only those clubs with more than 5 points and
ended up with 251 clubs from 174 cities. For basketball, the proposed index is built from the database of European Cup results since the
first match in 1958. We calculated the number of points obtained over this period by the clubs in the three European Cups on the basis of
one point per null game and two points per winning game. Over 700 clubs have taken part at least once in these competitions, so we retained
only those that obtained at least 20 points. This admittedly subjective criterion made it possible to limit the study population to 221 clubs.
6 The specific character of Greater Paris, with a great many sports clubs but few outstanding results, especially in football, also suggests
an explanation for this drop in success. One might even hypothesize a second critical threshold, above which sports compete with a
multitude of other leisure activities, although this remains to be demonstrated.
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Clubs in medium-sized cities
The establishment of major-league clubs in medium-
sized cities (under the threshold of one million
inhabitants) is likely to lead to failure. Admittedly,
holding championships in cities of roughly the same
size will lead to the creation of minor leagues in
Europe. However, these championships, which
would serve as training grounds for young players,
will be largely excluded from the audio-visual
market, unless a solidarity agreement exists between
‘big’ and ‘little’ clubs.
Private investors, much solicited in Europe since
the nineties, have understood this. As already noted
by Durand: ‘‘The operators have already shown their
interest in the clubs playing in large urban centres
despite the fact that other teams have presented
better results in the championships’’ (Durand,
1999). In view of one day establishing NBA clubs
in Europe, David Stern, the NBA commissioner, has
been examining potential sites. He has not men-
tioned Pau-Orthez, Limoges, Vittoria or Treviso,
although they are among the most famous teams in
Europe, but instead is concentrating on the big cities
like London, Paris and Berlin, none of which are
particularly known for basketball!7
The local communities also face a dilemma. The
construction of big, expensive and hard-to-manage
facilities, which in some cases will be exclusively
used by the professional team, is a risky undertaking
in cities with fewer than a million inhabitants. Like
North America (not including Mexico), Western
Europe has about 50 cities with more than a million
inhabitants (Table VII). This similarity in the
demographic structure of about 300 million inhabi-
tants makes the emergence of closed European
leagues a real possibility. These leagues would
Table II. Cities, populations, and teams in major-league soccer (Spain and Germany, 2001/2002).
Metropolitan Population
(/1000)
European in
Rank (1)
National Rank (2) Terms in 2001/02 Pop/Teams
SPAIN
Madrid 4 545 4 1 Real Madrid, Rayo Vallecano 2 273
Barcelona 3 922 5 2 FC Barcelona, Espanyol Barcelone 1 961
Valencia 1 288 29 3 Valence CF, Villareal CF 644
Sevilla 952 44 4 Real Betis, Sevilla FC 476
Bilbao 944 45 5 Athletic Club Bilbao 944
Malaga/Costa del Sol 819 50 6 Malaga CF 819
Zaragoza 604 72 8 Real Zaragoza 604
Las Palmas 598 73 9 UD Las Palmas 598
Palma de Mallorca 369 109 11 Real Mallorca 369
Valladolid 350 113 12 Real Valladolid 350
Santa Cruz 339 119 13 CD Tenerife 339
Vigo 334 124 14 RC Celta Vigo 334
San Sebastian 326 129 16 Real Sociedad 326
La Corogne 314 139 19 Deportivo La Coruna 314
Pamplona 248 178 21 CA Osasuna 248
Vitoria 208 209 24 Deportivo Alavés 208
GERMANY
Rhein/Ruhr-Centrum 4 598 3 1 FC Schalke 04, Borussia Dortmund 2 299
Berlin 3 624 7 2 Hertha BSC 3 624
Rhein/Ruhr-WN-Düsseldorf 2 461 12 3 VfL Borussia Mönchengladbach 2 461
Rhein/Ruhr-Köln/Bonn 2 147 17 4 Bayer Leverkusen, FC Cologne 1 074
Hamburg 2 051 19 5 Hamburger SV, FC Sankt Pauli 1 026
München 1 594 23 6 Bayern Munich, Munich 1860 797
Stuttgart 1 138 35 8 VfB Stuttgart 1 138
Bremen 736 56 10 SV Werder Bremen 736
Nürnberg 729 58 12 FC Nürnberg 729
Rostock 253 175 28 FC Hansa Rostock 253
Freiburg im Breisgau 204 212 33 SC Freiburg 204
Cottbus 136 231 47 Energie Cottbus 136
Wolfsburg 127 236 52 VfL Wolfsburg 127
Kaiserslautern 98 259 75 FC Kaiserslautern 98
7 The newspaper, L’Equipe , Monday October 28, 2002, p.17. Another American league, the NFL, has already been established in
Europe as the NFL-Europe and serves as a reservoir for its big sister on the other side of the Atlantic. This league is made up of six teams
located only in big urban centers: the Amsterdam Admirals, who play in the Arena, one of most modern stadiums in Europe; the Glasgow
Claymores; the Barcelona Dragons; the Düsseldorf Rhein Fire; the Frankfurt Galaxy and the Berlin Thunder.
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integrate teams located only in the 50 largest cities,
on condition that these latter agree to take on the
burden of financing adapted facilities.
Big clubs in smaller countries
The big clubs in smaller countries will be handi-
capped by a limited national market (notably, tele-
visual) and thus forced to band together or be
absorbed into the championships of bigger countries,
thereby excluding the smaller teams of these leagues.
This is now being observed throughout the world.
See for instance the project to fuse the Austrian and
Swiss football championships or the request of the
Glasgow ‘Old Firm’ (Celtic and Rangers) to join the
Premier League in England. The creation of an
‘Atlantic’ league, putting together the largest Portu-
guese, Dutch, Belgian and Danish clubs, is also now
under consideration. The Anderlecht team, near
Brussels, would like to join the French League
Championship, an idea that is not that far-fetched
given its political, geographic and linguistic proxi-
mity to France. The classic sports federations have
up to now refused any exemption from the principle
of club nationality (except for Monaco which plays
in the French League), but pressure from the private
operators is constant.
It also appears that the most balanced national
championships provide less competitive clubs at
the European level. The mechanism was described
by Thomas Hoehn and Stefan Szymanski in
these terms: ‘‘The interlocking system of leagues
that currently operates in Europe is untenable
because of the increasing dominance of competition
in a Euroleague. Members of a Euroleague invest
more in playing talent than the remainder of clubs,
causing domestic leagues to become increasingly
unbalanced. The most natural solution for this
problem is for the Euroleague members to cease
playing in the national leagues, thus making those
competitions more balanced’’ (Hoehn & Szymansky,
1999).8
Table III. Cities, populations, and teams in major-league soccer (Italy and England, 2001/2002).
Metropolitan Area Population (/1 000) European Rank (1) National Rank (2) Teams in 2001/02 Pop/Teams
ITALY
Milano 3 907 6 1 Inter Milan, Milan AC 1 953
Roma 2 986 10 3 AS Roma, Lazio Rome 1 493
Torino 1 491 24 4 Juventus, Torino 745
Firenze 958 43 5 Fiorentina 958
Bologna 574 76 10 Bologna FC 574
Venezia 471 86 12 AC Venezia 471
Bergamo 343 118 14 Atalanta Bergamo 343
Brescia 315 138 16 Brescia Calcio 315
Verona 292 149 18 AC Chievo, Hellas Verone 292
Parma 174 236 27 Parma AC 174
Lecce 167 238 29 US Lecce 167
Perugia 149 241 32 AC Perugia 149
Udine 128 254 45 Udinese Calcio 128
Piacenza 104 261 52 Piacenza FC 104
ENGLAND
Greater London 7 689 2 1 Arsenal FC, Chelsea FC, West Ham
United, Tottenham Hotspur, Charlton
Athletic, Fulham FC
1 281
Greater Manchester 2 341 14 2 Manchester United, Bolton Wanderers 1 170
West Midlands 2 341 15 3 Aston Villa 2 341
West Yorkshire 1 468 25 4 Leeds United 1 468
Merseyside 1 028 40 5 Liverpool FC, Everton FC 514
Tyneside 776 54 6 Newcastle United 776
Middlesborough 580 75 9 Middlesbrough FC 580
Leicester 409 94 12 Leicester City 409
Southampton 270 162 20 Southampton FC 270
Derby 218 198 26 Derby County 218
Sunderland 201 217 29 Sunderland AFC 201
Blackburn 141 238 38 Blackburn Rovers 141
Ipswich 130 242 42 Ipswich Town 130
8 The authors foresee the creation of a closed league made up of four conferences of 15 clubs each. The Southwest League would include
four countries (France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium); the Northern League, seven (the Netherlands, England, Norway, Denmark, Scotland,
Sweden, Finland); the Eastern League, 14 Eastern European countries; and, finally, the Central League would oppose Italian, German and
Swiss clubs.
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With the construction of a political Europe under-
way, these geographical groupings should appear as
symbolically positive to the political authorities. The
North American system of leagues divided into
geographical ‘conferences’, with inter-conference
confrontation, is a viable model from both a sporting
and an economic point of view.9 This system is
already well-established in the US. Such groupings
in Europe would condemn the weakest clubs to the
role of ‘also rans’, at best they would play a
subsidiary role of training young players in lower-
level championships. Without the opportunity to
access the principal market, these clubs would
remain at the second or third levels.
Table IV. Cities, populations, and teams in major-league soccer (France, 2001/2002).
Metropolitan Area Population n (/1 000) European Ranka Nation I Ranka Terms in 2001/02 Pop/Teams
FRANCE
Paris 9 319 1 1 Paris SG 9 319
Lyon 1 262 31 2 Olympique Lyonnais 1 262
Marseille 1 231 32 3 Olympique de Marseille 1 231
Lille 959 42 4 Lille OSC 959
Bordeaux 696 62 5 Bordeaux FC 696
Nantes 496 84 8 Nantes FCNA 496
Lens 323 130 16 RC Lens 323
Montpellier 248 179 22 Montpellier HSC 248
Rennes 245 181 23 Stade Rennais FC 245
Metz 193 232 31 FC Metz 193
Troyes 123 246 45 ES Troyes 123
Lorient 116 249 48 FC Lorient 116
Belfort 79 270 69 FC Sochaux 79
Monaco 66 283 82 AS Monaco 66
Bastia 53 309 108 SC Bastia 53
Auxerre 42 331 130 AJ Auxerre 42
Sedan 29 369 168 CS Sedan 29
Guingamp 18 452 251 Guingamp EAG 18
Source: Geopolis, B. Helleu.
aEuropean Rank of the Metropolitan Area.
bNational Rank of the Metropolitan Area.
Spain: no teams for Gijon (National Rank 7) and Cadiz (10).
Germany: no teams for Frankfurt (7), Dresden (9), Hannover (11).
Italy: no teams for Napoli (2), Genova (6), Palermo (7), Bari (8), Catania (9), Salerno (11). The economic break between the north and the
south of Italy is very strong.
England: no teams for Sheffield (7), Nottingham (8), Bristol (10).
France: no teams for Nice (6), Toulouse (7), Toulon (9), Grenoble (10).
Figure 3. Size of the cities and successes in European soccer cups (1956/2001).
9 The political homogeneity of the United States has limited the extension of clubs to only seven Canadian franchises. The establishment
of clubs in Mexico or Puerto Rico has encountered difficulties because of very different levels of prosperity.
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Competition in the same sports
The creation of leagues based on economic criteria
will threaten the survival of other types of competi-
tion in the same sport: the Olympic Games, World or
European Championships, National Cups, and so
on. In particular, this raises the issue of the timing of
these competitions with respect to league schedules.
In other words, it raises questions about the sports
calendar.
Currently, American league players compete for
their national teams on a voluntary basis . . . and with
the agreement of their employers. This question,
which is crucial in hockey and basketball, seems to
be becoming more sensitive in football and rugby.
Within the same sport, the organizing bodies such
as the IOC, the international federations, the con-
tinental confederations, the public or private na-
tional leagues and the ‘historic’ national sports
federations, may all be considered as mutually
competitive. They all have to share the same market.
The multiplication of competitive events, which
devours days in the athletic season, may lead (in
the long term) the clubs (or their players) to
participate only in selected competitions.10
Figure 4. (Map) European cities and athletic successes in European soccer matches (1956/2001).
Table V. Participation, trophies and overall performance in
European championship cups in soccer (1995/2003).
Team Nat. Team Points App. 1st
Real Madrid Esp 178 7 3
Juventus Turin Ita 112 7 1
Bayern Munich Ger 105 7 1
Manchester United Eng 94 8 1
Milan AC Ita 70 5 1
Ajax Amsterdam Ned 63 6 1
FC Valencia Esp 54 3
Borussia Dortmund Ger 53 6 1
FC Barcelona Esp 37 7
Bayer Leverkusen Ger 35 5
Dynamo Kiev Ukr 28 8
Panathinaı̈kos Athens Gre 19 5
Inter Milan Ita 18 3
FC Porto Por 17 7
Galatasaray Istanbul Tur 17 7
Rosenborg Trondheim Nor 16 8
Deportivo La Coruna Esp 15 3
Arsenal (London) Eng 14 5
Paris Saint-Germain Fra 14 3
AS Monaco Fra 13 2
Spartak Moscow Rus 13 8
Leeds United Eng 12 1
FC Nantes Fra 11 2
Olympiakos Pireus Gre 11 6
Source : UEFA.
10 In 2000, Manchester United withdrew from the English FA Cup to take part in the new CLUB world championship organized in
Brazil by FIFA. Some clubs are already forced to send their reserve team to certain matches, national cups in particular, because they cannot
keep up with the competition schedule.
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Demographic structures
The demographic structure of certain countries and/
or their slow economic development will perma-
nently split the European continent. The GDPs of
the 15 European Member States (pre 2004) show
major disparities (Behrens, 2003).11 The GDP per
capita varies by a ratio of 1 (Greek region of Ipeiros)
to 5 (Inner London). Within a given country, the
data show considerable variations. In Germany (with
an average value of 106), the mean value is 182 for
the inhabitants of the Hamburg region while that of
Brandenbourg barely reaches 69. In Metropolitan
France, the value varies from 158 in the Paris region
to 81 in Nord Pas-de-Calais. The figures concerning
the Acceding States entering the European Union in
May 2004, confirm the disparities in economic
Figure 5. Size of the cities and successes in European basketball cups (1957/2001).
Figure 6. (Map) European cities and success in European basketball cups (1957/2001).
11 The document provides data for the 212 regions, NUTS level 2, of the 15 Member States (pre-2004) and the 56 regions of the 10 New
Member States (methodological limitations related to inter-region worker flows do not negate the lessons to be drawn from this document).
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development both within and between countries.
Thus, only four of the 56 regions of applicant
countries are above 75% of the continental average
(15 Member States of the EC plus 10 Acceding
States). Some regions of Romania present a GDP
per capita that is 18% of the average value.12
Another problem might primarily concern French
clubs. France has a very specific urban demography:
a very small number of big cities (populations greater
than 1 million) in comparison with the total popula-
tion. Although Paris is the largest city in Europe,
there are only three cities with more than a million
people: Lyon, Marseilles and Lille. This character-
istic cannot be fully compensated by either the
presence of strong national television broadcasters
or the economic prosperity of quite a few French
regions.13 This aspect is worrisome for the future,
since very few French clubs would fulfill the
economic conditions for joining the newly created
major leagues.14
This intra-continental economic imbalance would
be markedly accentuated by leagues built on eco-
nomic criteria. The recent evolution of the UEFA
Champions’ League has already shown this.
Although no club will be completely excluded from
competition, access to the final games (play-offs,
finals) is practically reserved for the teams of the
three dominant countries (England, Spain and
Italy). This last point calls our attention to the
political dimension of an ‘Americanisation’ of Eur-
opean leagues.
Questions for the future
The predominance of demographic criteria in Eur-
ope would probably engender commercial and
mainly political problems. Championships between
teams coming essentially from the four or five biggest
and richest Western European countries would
emphasize the already existing fracture in the en-
larged European Union, at a time when it should be
striving for homogeneity. In response, governments
could insist on adapted conditions of access for clubs
located in less prosperous regions. This would
provide an opportunity for cities in which sports
are of particular social importance to compete
honourably in a major European league. Moreover,
the future of national competition comes under
question in a context dominated by the internatio-
nalization of both team constitution and club com-
petition.
Table VI. Participation, trophies, and overall performance in the ULEB basketball cup (1999/2002).
Rank Team Country App. 1st Points
1 Pallacanestro Treviso ITA 3 0 84
2 Virtus Bologna ITA 3 1 84
3 FC Barcelona ESP 3 1 80
4 Saski Baskonia Vitoria ESP 3 0 78
5 Olympiakos Piraeus GRE 3 0 66
6 Panathinaikos Athens GRE 2 1 66
7 Fortitudo Bologna ITA 3 0 66
8 Olimpija Ljubljana SVN 3 0 62
9 CSKA Moscow RUS 2 0 56
10 Real Madrid ESP 3 0 56
11 Maccabi Tel-Aviv ISR 2 0 48
12 Efes Pilsen Istanbul TUR 2 0 48
13 AEK Athens GRE 3 0 48
14 Ulker Istanbul TUR 2 0 44
15 Cibona Zagreb CRO 3 0 34
16 Zalgiris Kaunas LTU 3 0 32
17 AS Villeurbanne-Lyon FRA 2 0 30
18 CB Malaga ESP 2 0 28
19 EB Pau-Orthez FRA 2 0 26
20 Buducnost Podgorica SBM 3 0 24
Source : ULEB.
12 Only the national figure is available for Turkey, 28. The Baltic countries, which have traditionally trained basketball players, have
values of 34 (Latvia), 39 (Lithuania) and 44 (Estonia), all appreciably lower than those of Western Europe.
13 These cities rank, respectively, 34th, 35th and 44th in Europe. The fifth largest French city, Bordeaux, and its 700,000 inhabitants are
61st in Europe in terms of population.
14 Moreover, high taxes and social security costs handicap French companies. Lobbying for a system of exemptions is at the heart of the
activities of the leaders of French professional sports.
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The idea of a mixed North American and Eur-
opean model has sometimes been raised. Bourg
(2003), for example, suggested the possibility ‘‘of a
competition founded by 24 clubs automatically
qualified according to the criteria of the UEFA and
8 clubs selected on the basis of the results of the
national championships. This structure is very
similar to the so-called Intertoto.’’15 We are some-
what sceptical, however, about a structure that has
never been tested. Indeed, the access of eight clubs
based on sporting performance criteria would con-
tribute to an imbalance in the national champion-
ships. It is also highly improbable that these clubs
(allowed to play against the ‘top teams’) would really
be competitive ‘on the field’.
In any case, many observers have concluded that a
close link between national and European competi-
tion is no longer tenable because this necessarily
implies competitive imbalance in the national cham-
pionships. This phenomenon is detrimental for both
the ‘big teams’, who cannot find credible opponents,
and the smaller teams, who are increasingly confined
to the role of making others look good.
As is often the case, the change in criteria is
occurring without apparent rupture, but instead is
being accomplished by a slow and almost uncon-
scious social transition. Nevertheless, this ‘smooth’
change is the result of constant club pressure on the
‘historic’ federal authorities and sometimes of lob-
bies like G14, a confederation of the 20 most
powerful football clubs in Europe. Fortunately, a
rupture has up to now been avoided. . . and instead a
quiet revolution is underway, without major political
crises and with all concerned parties avoiding detri-
mental clashes.
The structure of professional sports has been
shifting since the early nineties. As mentioned by
Bourg (2003): ‘‘the link between sport and territory
will be questioned.’’ As in the United States, we will
possibly observe the geographic mobility of clubs in
search of the best financial package for their owners
(Bourg & Gouguet, 1998). The future will not be a
prolongation of the past but instead is already
forcing us to completely rethink professional sports
for a new century. The permeability of borders and
changing concepts of nationality will redistribute the
cards in Europe and lead to new formulae, better
adapted to the constraints and structures of the Old
Continent.
The role of the European nations and, in the last
analysis, of public opinion will probably be more
pronounced than it is in North America. This will
bring to the debate social and political dimensions
that are likely to interfere with the economic aspects
of the issue.
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Augustin, J. (1995). Sport, géographie et aménagement . Paris:
Nathan.
Baade, R. (1996). An analysis of trends in the market for
professional sports teams and stadiums: separating myth from
reality, antitrust issues in relocation of professional sports
franchises, hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-
trust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Committee of
the Judiciary, Washington DC: United States Senate, p. D1396
(available from October 2003).
Baade, R., & Matheson, V. (2001). Home run or wild pitch? The
economic impact of major league baseball’s all-star game.
Journal of Sports Economics , 2 , 307/326.
Bale, J. (1993). Sport, space and the city. London: Routledge.
Behrens, A. (2003). Le produit intérieur brut régional dans l’Union
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